We investigate the effect of caution in real operating and investment decisions -which can be thought of as real conservatism -on the firm's profitability and accounting conservatism. We document that firms exhibiting caution in their real decisions are characterized by higher profitability in the long run, lower probability of business failure, and lower conditional accounting conservatism. We provide evidence that managerial caution is distinct from risk-aversion, over-optimism, and overconfidence. We also argue that precautionary motive provides a more parsimonious explanation for a decrease in discretionary spending than real earnings management. Our results are relevant to accounting because caution is a real property that is strongly related to several accounting variables and has been extensively studied in economics and finance yet the accounting literature to date has largely ignored it.
Managerial Caution, Operating Performance, and Accounting Conservatism 子曰："以約失之者，鮮矣。"
The Master said: "The cautious seldom err." -Li Ren, the Analects of Confucius: circa 500 BC
I. INTRODUCTION
Accounting conservatism, defined as the difference in verification standards applied to the recognition of gains versus losses, has received considerable attention in the academic literature since Basu (1997) , which proposed an empirical method of estimating it. There is compelling evidence that financial statements of listed companies are, on average, conservative and that there exists considerable cross-sectional variation in the degree of conservatism (see, e.g., Ball et al. 2011 for a recent review). Based on the evidence available to date, the most important benefits that it brings about stem from the reduction in the costs of contracting and litigation (see, e.g., Quang 2007). But, even as accounting conservatism has been cogently advocated by the academics (see, e.g., LaFond and Watts 2008) , it has been consistently opposed by the standard setters. In particular, the Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAS) No. 2 (FASB 2008, § 93) states that "conservatism has long been identified with the idea that deliberate understatement is a virtue. That notion became deeply ingrained and is still in evidence despite efforts over the past 40 years to change it." In this paper we attempt to reconcile the two approaches to conservatism that, at first blush, appear incompatible.
To do this, we focus on the distinction between real economic decisions made by corporate managers and the decisions about financial reporting made by accountants, for there is no a priori reason to expect that the two groups would operate in a coherent manner. This distinction is relevant to any discussion of the notion of conservatism, which can refer to either type of decisions. SFAS No. 2 defines conservatism as "a prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that uncertainties and risks inherent in business situations are adequately considered" (ibid, § 95) . This definition can be applied to both real decisions made by managers and reporting decisions made by accountants. It appears that the Financial Accounting Standards Board pays at least as much attention to managerial decision as to financial reporting ones. In the handout prepared for its Financial information needs to be neutral -free from bias intended to influence a decision or outcome. To that end, the common conceptual framework should not include conservatism or prudence among the desirable qualitative characteristics of accounting information. However, the framework should note the continuing need to be careful in the face of uncertainty. [Emphasis in the original.]
The FASB appears to hold a view that a company run by cautious managers -i.e., the ones that are "careful in the face of uncertainty" -stands to gain little from accounting conservatism.
Our results support this position. Combining theoretical insights from economics and evolutionary biology, we argue that it is optimal for some companies to be cautious (in the sense to be made precise presently) and for others to be "reckless." We propose an empirical measure of caution and validate it by showing that, consistent with theoretical predictions, companies characterized as cautious exhibit greater long-term accounting profitability and lower probability of business failure, as measured by Atlman's (1968) Z-Score.
We then demonstrate that cautious companies exhibit significantly lower levels of conditional accounting conservatism as measured by the asymmetric-timeliness model (Basu 1997 and Roychowdhury 2008 ) and the C-Score (Khan and Watts 2009 ). This evidence is consistent with our argument that managerial caution and accounting conservatism are substitutes in the sense that the presence of the latter is called for only in the absence of the former. We show that the correlation between caution and the usual measures of risk inherent in the company's operations, standard deviation in ROA and cash flows, is low but significantly positive: this result suggests that our measure caution is capturing a construct that is distinct from (the opposite of) risk aversion, over-optimism, and overconfidence. We also argue that the precautionary motive provides a more parsimonious explanation for the positive association between real earnings management and future performance reported in Gunny (2010) and Chen et al. (2011) than the signaling hypothesis proposed by Chen et al. Our results are robust to alternative empirical specifications.
Caution received considerable attention in economics (we review the relevant literature in Section II).
Following Bernanke (1983) , we define caution as a propensity (i.e., willingness and ability) to take precautionary measures in the face of uncertainty perceived by the decision maker. Intuitively, caution can be thought of as the quality of being vigilant and reflective -i.e., as a superior ability to discern emergent threats or opportunities such as unexpected political, economic, or technological developments, which gives her additional time to gather necessary information and results in better decisions. At the most basic level, the decision maker can take two precautionary actions: (i) postpone decisions that involve discretionary spending, (ii) deliberately reduce her discretionary spending so as to increase precautionary savings, or both.
Although the two economic mechanisms proposed to explain caution are conceptually distinct, they generate essentially the same empirical prediction that it improves the expected long-term profitability of the firm. Yet too much caution can result in forgoing profitable investment opportunities (see, e.g., Bates et al. 2009 ) and thus have a detrimental effect. We thus view the value of caution as an empirical question.
The paper makes the following contributions. First, we extend the literature studying the relation between firm fundamentals and accounting quality, which includes the literature on accounting conservatism, by providing evidence that i) accounting conservatism is distinct from managerial caution and ii) that the former and the latter are substitutes. Since the profitability of a firm operating in a continually changing environment is determined by the ability of its managerial team to adapt to changes, studying the characteristics of the firm's decision-making, such as caution, provides a valuable insight in the firm's operations. In turn, the understanding of fundamental performance is critical to the study of accounting quality, as pointed out, e.g., in Dechow et al. (2010) . In the conservatism literature, Biddle et al. (2011a, b) argue that accounting conservatism compels managers to make business decisions that reduce downside risk. It is, however, at least as probable that causation runs in the opposite direction -i.e., that the style of managerial decision making affects the properties of the accounting system. Several recent papers they investigate the effect that a firm's operating decisions have on the properties of its accounting information and report evidence consistent with this argument: e.g., Zhang (2007) demonstrates that the quality of accruals is closely related to growth; Wu et al. (2010) show that the factors that influence growth, such as prevailing discount rates, also influence accrual quality. There is also an emerging literature studying the effect of accounting quality on managerial decisions: see, e.g., Biddle and Hilary (2006) , McNichols and Stubben (2008) , and Biddle et al. (2009) .
Second, we contribute to the growing literature on earnings management through the manipulation of real activities (usually referred to as real earnings management). This literature, which includes Roychowdhury (2006), Cohen et al. (2008) , Bhojraj et al. (2009 ), Gunny (2010 , Badertscher (2011), and Zang (2012) , among others, argues that managers are often willing to cut discretionary expenses (e.g., R&D and advertising) in order to meet a performance target such as a consensus analyst forecast. In this paper we argue that, although unscrupulous managers willing to distort economic activities for the sake of a short-term gain exist, the vast majority of managers make their decisions in good faith. Since optimal decisions in the face of uncertainty as a rule involve a decrease in discretionary expenses, the incidence of such a decrease does not, in and of itself, suffice to draw inference about opportunistic behavior on the part of the managers. Consistent with this observation, Gunny (2010) and Chen et al. (2011) document that the firms that engage in what these authors classify as real earnings management exhibit better future operating performance and market returns. Our explanation does not contradict the signaling hypothesis proposed in Chen et al. (2010) to explain this positive relation and should be viewed as complementary. We believe that by considering the precautionary motive, future studies of real earnings management will be able derive sharper insights.
Finally, we extend the literature on the relation between corporate decision making and operating performance. Starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976) , a large literature in corporate finance and economics has argued that the agency problem often arises from the excessive risk-avoidance on the part of the managers and proposed various avenues of alleviating this problem. For example, Low (2009) and Edmans et al. (2009) focus on the provision of incentives and John et al. (2008) and Kim and Lu (2011) study the effect of corporate governance on the manager's propensity to implement investment projects characterized by inefficiently low levels of risk. We show that caution, the characteristic that has been extensively studied in economics and decision making but has been largely overlooked by the accounting literature to date, has a sizeable effect on firm performance and merits further investigation.
In the following section, we explicate the theoretical approaches to caution proposed in economics and decision making and develop empirically testable predictions. In Section III we explain our methodology and report our empirical results in Section IV, followed by a brief discussion in Section V. Section VI concludes.
II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
In this section we review and synthesize the results reported in theoretical and empirical studies and derive our empirical predictions. We focus on the following two mechanisms that have been proposed in economics to explain managerial caution: (1) the real options mechanism and (2) the precautionary savings mechanism operating through personal preferences of the decision maker. We argue that theoretical results derived in evolutionary biology provide a compelling explanation of the cross-sectional variation in caution by showing that both cautious and "reckless" companies can coexist in equilibrium. We argue that caution i) is a real phenomenon that has been recognized as a virtue throughout the recorded human history, ii) increases the profitability of the firm, iii) decreases the probability of business failure, and iv) is negatively associated with (conditional) accounting conservatism.
Economic Theories of Caution (1): Real Options
The economics literature has studied two mechanisms explaining caution that are not directly related to risk aversion. The first mechanism is present when decisions are, at least to some extent, irreversible, which is true of most capital investment projects; in these situations adjustment costs are either asymmetric or nonconvex (or both). In a multi-period setting with irreversibility and imperfect competition the ability to wait until uncertainty is resolved is, in general, valuable to the decision maker. This ability represents the value of a real option, which is extinguished when the decision is made. Henry (1974) , Cukierman (1980), and Bernanke (1983) are among the first studies formally demonstrating the negative relation between uncertainty and investment. These studies show that an increase in uncertainty increases the value of the real option and, hence, the value of waiting until uncertainty is (at least partially) resolved. To emphasize the distinction between caution and risk-aversion, Henry, Cukierman, and Bernanke consider risk-neutral decision makers; the argument, therefore, applies to corporations, which are supposed to be risk-neutral, to the same extent as it applies to individuals. Bernanke derives the bad news principle of irreversible investment: of all possible future outcomes only the unfavorable ones have a bearing on the current willingness to undertake a given project. He explains (on p. 93):
We see that what irreversible investment is sensitive to is "downside" uncertainty. Here is the source of the "caution" of investors and consumer durables buyers described in the introduction; a small increase in the probability of disaster cannot be offset by any potential good news in its effect on current purchases.
This line of research is continued in McDonald and Siegel (1986) , Pindyck (1988) , and others.
A related strand of theoretical studies that originates in Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983) reaches the opposite conclusion: these authors show that, under certain conditions, the relation between investment and uncertainty is positive. Caballero (1991) explains that the sign of the investment-uncertainty relation depends on the type of production function and the degree of competition; in particular, assuming constant returns to scale, the relation is positive when the market is sufficiently competitive. More recently, economic theorists working on the models of real options have attempted to distinguish between risk, which is the concept used in the above studies, and Knightian uncertainty, or ambiguity. In particular, Nishimura and Ozaki (2004) study the decision of an unemployed worker whether to accept a job or continue searching and show that, while an increase in risk delays the time of acceptance, an increase in ambiguity speeds it up because by accepting the job the worker turns uncertainty about the distribution of wages into certainty. The model in Miao and Wang (2011) is based on similar intuition: these authors demonstrate that, if exercising the option by investing in the project reduces uncertainty, then more ambiguity causes the decision maker to exercise the option earlier, provided that she is sufficiently ambiguity-averse.
In other words, theoretical studies demonstrate that the sign of the uncertainty-investment relation may be either positive or negative, depending on the formulation of the problem. One approach to reconciling the contradictory theoretical results is to note that the critically important component -uncertainty -is not defined consistently. Earlier studies model situations properly characterized as risky but not ambiguous because the decision makers are endowed with the knowledge of the relevant probability distributions. But in most real-life situations managers are uncertain about future events -such as unexpected changes in politics, technology, or the economic environment -to which they cannot assign a probability distribution: in these cases, they deal with ambiguity. Recent studies that explicitly attempt to model ambiguity, such as Nishimura and Ozaki (2004) and Miao and Wang (2011) , deliver important theoretical insights but do not describe real-life investment decisions. This is so because the positive relation between investment and ambiguity reported in these studies obtains in situations where uncertainty is completely resolved upon the exercise of the real option -whereas in reality the approval of an investment project signifies commitment but does not resolve any of the uncertainty about the future cash flows or the actions of competitors.
Another approach to interpreting the inconsistent theoretical predictions is to subject both theories to empirical tests. Several studies that follow this route provide overwhelming support for the negative relationship between uncertainty and investment. Hurn and Wright (1994) use a proportional hazard regression model to test the effect of economic, technological, and political uncertainty on the lag between the discovery of an oil field in the North Sea and the decision to develop it. These authors show that the variables that proxy for the geological features of the field and political factors (capturing technological and political uncertainty) have statistically significant negative relationship with the production-start-up lag. Leahy and Whited (1996) derive a measure of uncertainty from the variance of the firms' daily stock returns and report that "uncertainty exerts a strong negative influence on investment and that this influence bears little relationship to risk as conventionally measured" (p. 66). Guiso and Parigi (1999) use the survey of manufacturing companies conducted annually by the Bank of Italy to infer executives' assessment of uncertainty and report that uncertainty reduces investment; furthermore, the effect is stronger for the firms with higher extent of irreversibility and the ones that possess substantial market power. The most compelling empirical evidence is reported by Bloom (2009) , who uses implied volatility measures to infer uncertainty and documents a rapid drop in hiring, aggregate capital investment, aggregate output, and productivity growth. We use these results as a guide in developing our measures of caution, which we infer from the managers' simultaneous decision to reduce hiring, capital investment, and discretionary spending.
The overwhelming empirical support of the negative relation between uncertainty and investment is not surprising since caution has been recognized as a virtue over at least two millennia (cf. the opening quote): it must, therefore, be the case that precautionary actions in the face of uncertainty are beneficial as a general rule, even though speeding up one's decisions may be desirable on occasion. Since the fundamental assumptions underlying the theoretical models in this line of research -irreversibility and imperfect competition -are likely to hold in most real-life situation, the result that uncertainty has a negative effect on investment can also be viewed as more general.
Economic Theories of Caution (2): Precautionary Savings
The second mechanism proposed to explain caution traces the need for precautionary measures -usually, an increase in savings -to the decision-makers' preference to smooth consumption over time, provided that she has a limited ability to transfer resources across time periods. Leland (1968) , Drèze and Modigliani (1972) , and Kimball (1990) derive the conditions under which a risk-averse decision maker responds to an increase in uncertainty by increasing her precautionary savings -i.e., exhibits caution. Kimball (who refers to this characteristic as prudence) proposes the index of absolute prudence, defined as the ratio, with a minus sign, of the third to the second derivatives of the utility function, to measure the size of the precautionary saving motive; the index of relative prudence is defined in a similar manner. In general, the precautionary motive has been shown to be stronger than risk aversion (see Carroll and Kimball 2008 ): e.g., for a constant relative risk aversion utility function, relative prudence equals relative risk aversion plus one.
There are two channels through which the precautionary savings mechanism affects corporate decision making. First, as shown in Hilary and Hui (2009) , companies' investment decisions are influenced by risk preferences of their employees. Since the effect of the precautionary motive is, in general, greater than that of risk-aversion, the effect of caution should be at least as strong as that reported by Hilary and Hui. Second, the precautionary savings argument can be applied to corporations directly. Han and Qiu (2007) and Riddick and Whited (2009) show analytically and empirically that the precautionary motive is present in companies that face financing constraints. The latter channel has been extensively researched in the finance literature: empirical evidence (see, e.g., Bates et al. 2009 and Denis and Sibilkov 2010) demonstrates that, the marked increase in cash holdings over time is at least partially explained by the precautionary motive. Note, however, that financing constraints are likely to be endogenous since they are related to both uncertainty (which determines the required rate of return: see, e.g., Butler et al. 2011) and caution since companies run by cautious managers are likely to have easier access to capital markets.
Although the precautionary savings mechanism offers a plausible explanation of caution and is consistent with our results, it depends upon several strong assumptions (principally, certain properties of the utility or production function and the presence of financing constraints) and, therefore, should be viewed as a special, albeit important and entirely plausible, case. Since the real options mechanism described above relies upon more fundamental properties of decision making under uncertainty -the (partial) irreversibility of important decisions and the sequential nature of learning -we believe that it is more general in the sense that it is likely to apply in situations that are different from the ones that are modeled in the above studies.
Sources of Cross-Sectional Variation in Caution
But if caution is unequivocally valuable, why would any "reckless" companies survive in a competitive environment? The real option mechanism is mostly silent on the sources of cross-sectional variation. We propose two closely related explanations. A sizeable literature in psychology and related disciplines reviewed most recently in Ellis et al. (2011) demonstrates the existence of marked differences in sensitivity to the environment across individuals; the differences persist over the lifetime and appear to be neurobiological in nature.
Individuals characterized by heightened sensitivity are more likely to detect subtle changes in their environment, to which they respond with quiet vigilance often accompanied by a temporary inhibition of activity.
High-sensitivity individuals also tend to be more discriminating at processing novel information, attentive, and "fundamentally more reflective" (Aron and Aron 1997, p. 349) . Since high sensitivity enhances the effect of both negative and positive environmental influences, children possessing it -the "orchid" children, to use the term coined in Boyce and Ellis (2005) -are more likely to develop into adults characterized by robust health, high self-esteem, and educational and professional success if they grow up in nurturing conditions surrounded by social support. As a result, the proportion of high-sensitivity individuals in the highest ranks of corporate hierarchies is likely to be higher than in the general population, where it is estimated at 15-25 percent (Aron and Aron 1997 ). An individual characterized by high sensitivity to the environment is more likely to discern the emergence of new opportunities and threats, which she will perceive as an increase in uncertainty, before they are noticed by others. Once an increase in uncertainty is detected, the real options mechanism switches on and ensures that the important (partially) irreversible decisions are postponed until uncertainty is resolved. Note that the theoretical studies of the real options mechanism focus on the timing of investment primarily for the sake of analytical convenience: the main insight is that decision makers faced with uncertainty have stronger incentives to search for new information.
But the argument above can also be applied to corporations rather than individual decision makers; in fact, since it is well known that corporate decision making is a collaborative exercise (see, e.g., March 1962), this is our preferred line of reasoning. Recent developments in theoretical biology provide the first steps in this direction. In particular, Wolf et al. (2008) propose an evolutionary model of a population that faces environmental uncertainty and demonstrate that i) both high-and low-sensitivity individuals coexist within a population and ii) the individual differences are stable over the lifetime. The model in Wolf et al. (2008) is sufficiently general to be applied to corporations as well as individuals. The main insight is that high sensitivity allows the player to distinguish between the states of the world that affect her payoffs -but comes at a cost; in the case of corporations, this cost can represent, e.g., the loss from being timid and making too many false-positive judgments. Since the benefits of high sensitivity are inversely related to its frequency in the population, it tends to become more frequent when rare but decreases in frequency when common. The general pattern is that low-sensitivity individuals tend to form a routine that helps them perform relatively well when their environment is stable but relatively poorly when it changes since they are not sensitive to subtle changes. In contrast, high-sensitivity individuals are strongly influenced by subtle changes: they do not form a routine and as a result perform relatively well when their environment changes. In other words, the coexistence of both the cautious and the "reckless" corporations emerges as an equilibrium response to uncerainty.
It is worth noting that the result reported in Wolf et al. (2008) that some decision makers choose to be of low-sensitivity type is similar in spirit to the argument in Grant and Quiggin (2011) that some decision makers may opt for a heuristic of remaining unaware if doing so is ecologically rational in the sense of increasing their expected payoffs. This observation demonstrates a fundamental connection between the literature on high sensitivity in theoretical biology and the literature on unawareness in decision theory (e.g., Li 2009 and Heifetz et al. 2011 ) that have, to date, remained independent and mostly unaware of each other.
The underlying mechanism of learning the properties of uncertain environments merits further theoretical and empirical investigation.
Combining the insights from the real options theory (e.g., Bernanke 1983) , which predicts that caution increases the profitability of the firm, and the result reported in Wolf et al. (2008) , which explains the presence of both high-and low-sensitivity corporations in the cross-section, we formulate our first hypothesis: Hypothesis 1. Companies that exhibit caution are characterized by higher long-term profitability.
Since waiting until uncertainty is resolved should, in general, allow the managers to acquire better information and thus make better operating and investment decisions, companies run by cautious management teams should also be characterized by lower operating risk. Our next hypothesis follows immediately:
Hypothesis 2. Companies that exhibit caution are characterized by lower probability of business failure.
Conservatism
Formally, conditional conservatism is defined as reporting bias: for example, in the binary framework used in Gigler and Hemmer (2001) , Chen et al. (2007) , and Nan and Wen (2011) it decreases the probability of obtaining high accounting signal given favorable fundamentals. Any bias in financial reporting that cannot be (easily) undone by the users reduces the information content of the reports and is, therefore, costly. Empirical studies (see, e.g., Watts 2003 , Qiang 2007 , and Zhang 2008 argue that, absent regulatory requirements, these costs are offset by the benefits from improved contracting and lower likelihood of litigation. Although the exact nature of contractual benefits of (conditional) conservatism is still being debated (see, e.g., Gigler et al. 2009 ), the observation that it involves costs does not appear to be contested. For example, the presence of costs underlies the argument in LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) that greater managerial ownership helps in alleviating the agency problem and thus reduces the need for conservatism and in LaFond and Watts (2008) that environments characterized by lower information asymmetry demand lower levels of conservatism. Given that accounting conservatism is costly, we expect it to be negatively associated with managerial caution. To see this, note that a conservative -i.e., biased -accounting system reports accounting losses more frequently and reports accounting profits less frequently than they occur in reality. But the benefit from the former is smaller and the loss from the latter is greater in cautious firms, which make investment and operating decisions equipped with better information and, as a result, are characterized by a lower probability of business failure. Our last hypothesis can thus be stated as follows:
Hypothesis 3. Companies that exhibit caution are characterized by lower conditional accounting conservatism.
On collective vs. individual decision making in corporations
Following Bertrand and Schoar (2003) , recent studies in corporate finance and managerial economics are dominated by the view that the style of corporate decision making is determined by the personal styles of individual executives. The managerial style hypothesis, however, is currently being disputed: e.g., Fee et al. (2011) demonstrate that firms tend to change both their managers and policies simultaneously, for what appear to be endogenous reasons. Chang et al. (2011) show that the firms employing the same manager match on several characteristics relating to operating and financing activities and organizational structure: i.e., executives are chosen not on the basis of their unique styles but, rather, on the basis of the specific needs of the hiring firm. Similar logic should also apply to the choice of directors. We adopt the view long expounded by organizational theorists (see, e.g., Morgan 2006) and economists (see, e.g., Guiso et al. 2006) that institutional cultures persist over time even as individuals come and go and treat a firm, rather than an individual executive, as the locus of the decision-making style and the unit of analysis. An emerging cross-disciplinary literature studying group performance argues further that a group of individuals is characterized by its own unique style: e.g., Woolley et al. (2010) demonstrates the existence of a general collective intelligence factor that is not strongly correlated with either the average or maximum individual intelligence of group members.
It is worth noting that caution is distinct from over-optimism and overconfidence, two personal traits that have received considerable attention in finance and economics: see, e.g., Hackbarth (2008) on the former and Malmendier and Tate (2005) , Goel and Thakor (2008) , and Gervais et al. (2011) on the latter. The literature defines the above properties as behavioral biases in estimating the distribution of a random variable such as future earnings, with over-optimism referring to an upward bias in the estimate of the first moment of the distribution (the mean) and overconfidence -to an upward bias in the estimate of the second moment (the precision). As shown above, neither of the two mechanisms proposed to explain caution implies any biases on the part of the decision maker, although both mechanisms would also operate in the presence of the biases. Since we view corporate decision making as a process shaped by institutional features such as the separation of decision making from the functions of decision control (see Fama and Jensen 1983) , we expect that the effect of personal behavioral biases on important corporate decisions, if present, is likely to be attenuated.
III. METHODOLOGY

Inferring caution as a revealed preference
A substantial increase in uncertainty in the wake of the global economic crisis provides an excellent opportunity to observe precautionary actions taken by corporations to protect themselves against unknown dangers that lie ahead. Consider the following quote from Financial Times (2011: October 12, p. 11):
[N]othing appears more uncertain than the outcome of Europe's sovereign debt crisis. … The longer it continues, the tighter access to bank credit becomes. More companies are seeking to protect their financial position and cash flow by freezing or cutting employment, capital investment and discretionary spending.
Fearing that the crisis may provoke a liquidity crunch, some are reducing production in order to lower stocks and strengthen cash reserves.
That is, in response to an increase in perceived uncertainty companies temporarily pause or reduce their (1) employment, (2) capital investment, (3) discretionary spending. Owing to the differences in the theoretical arguments, the studies that follow the tradition of the real options literature, such as Bloom (2009), focus on actions 1 and 2, while the studies that follow the precautionary savings tradition, such as Han and Qiu (2007) , focus on action 3. But, since all three actions are observed in reality, we expect that companies are likely to take them simultaneously. Note that the tree actions mentioned above represent deviations from the normal activity levels and thus should result in a decrease in the firm's long-run profitability: this argument underlies the literature on real earnings management (see, e.g., Roychowdhury 2006) . Therefore, the evidence that the companies taking these actions -especially all three of them at once -exhibit superior future performance would indicate that the corporate decisions are made with the goal of value maximization.
Our next empirical challenge is measuring uncertainty perceived by decision makers. Bloom (2009) considers macro-economic shocks of sufficient magnitude to cause economy-wide drops in aggregate output that can be identified unambiguously by an outside observer. The Global Financial Crisis is one example of such a shock, so profound in its implications as to be noted by every corporate decision maker in the world.
But most uncertainty is specific to the firm: it usually relates to emergent technological, political, and economic developments that are perceived by the decision makers but may not be easily discernible by the general public. In fact, our explanation of the persistent cross-sectional variation in caution hinges precisely on this superior ability of some, but not all, corporation to perceive such nascent opportunities and threats. It is, therefore, firm-specific uncertainty that will influence managerial decisions most of the time. Unfortunately it is not in general observable, and existing empirical proxies are notorious for being noisy. In a painstaking study, Anderson et al. (2009) investigate the relation between risk, as measured by daily return volatility, and uncertainty, as measured by the dispersion of weighted professional forecasts, and demonstrate that the two constructs are essentially orthogonal (recall that a similar result is reported in Leahy and Whited 1996) . Anderson et al. further note: "It is important to remember that the agents inside our model are worried that the reference model is false, and if their worries are justified, our empirical regressions are misspecified as well" (p. 243). In other words, the researcher's view of uncertainty is likely to differ from the one used by the decision makers; insofar as this is the case, his empirical (or analytical) model will be misspecified.
Empirical proxies of caution
An ideal measure of uncertainty as perceived by the decision maker should, therefore, be based on her own assessment. One way to attain this goal is to use survey data, as do Guiso and Parigi (1999) . Alternatively, one can appeal to the revealed preference argument and infer decision-makers perception of uncertainty from her observable actions. In this paper, we pursue the latter route. Specifically, we assume that corporate decision makers are acting in good faith; we expect this assumption to hold in the vast majority of cases. Next, it follows from the argument above that companies simultaneously pausing or reducing capital investment, employee count, and discretionary spending must be doing so as precautionary measures -for otherwise they would have been deliberately reducing the value of the firm, which contradicts our maintained assumption. In other words, we use the pattern of precautionary actions described in the theoretical and empirical literature to make inferences about both uncertainty perceived by the decision makers and their type, which are inseparable in our formulation. The advantage of our approach is that it allows us to defer to the decision maker's assessment of uncertainty and thus avoid the above-mentioned problem of misspecification.
We define A t , a dummy variable for precautionary actions, as one if a firm simultaneously cuts capital investment and discretionary spending and reduces employee count in a given fiscal year (we call this a three-index setting). Our argument is that the managers who take all three precautionary actions at the same time are more likely to perceive uncertainty or to be cautious (or both), while a decrease in only one or two of the three measures mentioned above may be caused by other reasons. We then consider firm performance, probability of business failure, and accounting conservatism for five years following a year with A t = 1. Since caution is likely to be a persistent characteristic of a firm (i.e., its type), we consider firms that exhibit cautious behavior as cautious and investigate their performance, probability of business failure, and accounting conservatism for the entire firm history. We use a dummy variable TYPE to indicate such firms.
We acknowledge that, while caution is likely to be an intrinsic corporate characteristic, for it to manifest itself requires an increase in firm-specific uncertainty, which may or may not happen during our sample period. That is, companies reveal their types only when opportunities present themselves. Therefore, as a robustness test, we re-estimate the above indicators of caution (A t and TYPE) by incorporating an external measure of uncertainty, which we proxy by company-specific stock return volatility. This proxy captures an observed level of uncertainty in the company's operating environment, as perceived by market participants.
We then validate our measure of caution by demonstrating that, as predicted, it is associated with higher future economic performance and a lower probability of business failure. As a robustness test, we include the volatility index is included in the latter test. Similar to the three-index setting, we define A' t , a dummy variable for caution, as one if a company simultaneously cuts capital investment, employee count, and discretionary spending in a given fiscal year and its stock volatility is high (we call this a four-index setting). We use a dummy variable TYPE' to proxy for cautious firms in the four-index setting and look into their performance during the entire firm history. Since the three-index and four-index settings are constructed in a similar spirit, we expect similar results. We calculate A t and A' t as follows:
Decrease in investment. Following Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), we calculate the abnormal level of investment using prior three-year moving average as a benchmark. We define CI t as CE t -(CE t−1 + CE t−2 + CE t−3 ) ÷ 3, in which CE t-i is capital expenditures (Compustat annual item 128) scaled by sales (item 12) for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t − i. The investment indicator (INVEST) is equal to one if CI t is negative and zero otherwise. Usually, firm increases its investment to expand. A CI value less than zero indicates that this year's capital investment is less than the prior three years' average. We use sales as the deflator since the benchmark level of capital expenditures could grow proportionately with sales. In order to check the robustness of our results, we also try to use total assets as the deflator in the CI measure. The results (not reported) are similar.
Freeze in hiring.
In a similar manner, we calculate the abnormal level of employee count using prior three-year moving average as a benchmark. We use this measure following the results in Bloom (2009) indicating that companies reduce their payroll in response to uncertainty shocks. We define CT t as CP t -(CP t−1 + CP t−2 + CP t−3 ) ÷ 3, in which CP t-i is employee number for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t − i. The employee indicator (EMPLOYEE) is equal to one if CT t is negative and zero otherwise.
Cut in discretionary expense. The precautionary savings mechanism (Han and Qiu 2007) predicts that companies have incentives to increase their precautionary savings in the face of uncertainty -and the only way of attaining this goal is to reduce discretionary spending. The real options mechanism generates essentially prediction, albeit for a different reason: since most discretionary expenses are specific to given projects (e.g., R&D involves particular products), an increase in uncertainty calls for delaying their execution until better information becomes available. We estimate the normal level of discretionary expenditures using the following equation: DISX t /A t-1 =α 0 +α 1 (1/A t-1 ) +α 2 (S t-1 /A t-1 ) +ε t , where DISX t is discretionary expenditures (the sum of R&D, advertising, and SG&A expenses) in year t, A t-1 is total assets in year t -1, and S t-1 is the sales in year t -1. If R&D or advertising expense is missing, we replace it with zero. We estimate the above regression cross-sectionally for each industry (two-digit SIC) year. The abnormal level of discretionary expenditures is measured as the estimated residual from the regression. The expense indicator (EXPENSE) is equal to one if the residual is negative and zero otherwise. These activities include 1) accelerating sales by increasing sales discounts, 2) increasing production in order to reduce cost of goods sold, and 3) cutting discretionary expenses such as selling, general and administrative expenses. Factors influencing these activities include industry membership, stock of inventories, and receivables, among others.
The measure that we use to infer the cautious type from corporate decision is different from the measure of earnings manipulation. The reason is as follows. Since managerial caution is likely to persist over time even though individual managers change, we adopt the convention that a firm is labeled as cautious if there is at least one year in the sample where all three events described above are observed. Our measure is categorical and should be interpreted as a relative one; we, therefore, define the cut-off for our uncertainty measure in such a way that approximately one-half of all companies in the sample are classified as cautious. Therefore, our measure is less likely to be driven by incidents of earnings manipulation. If our cautious-type measure captures earnings manipulation, it should have a detrimental effect of future performance. That is, we would observe that future profitability of these firms is worse than that of their counterparts.
Volatility. The above three indexes capture the activities of a firm. As a robustness test, we also include firm-specific stock-market volatility, which is often used as a measure for uncertainty. Similar to abnormal investment, we define an increase in uncertainty if, over the course of the year, there is a sudden increase in stock volatility. Following Campbell et al. (2001) , we first use daily market-adjusted stock returns to compute the volatility of excess returns (i.e., the difference between daily return and value-weighted market returns) for each firm-month. The monthly volatility is scaled by the average of the volatility over the same fiscal year. Second, for each month we calculate the relative increase in monthly volatility, V m , which is the difference between the average volatility during month 0 to +2 and the average volatility during month -3 to -1. This step helps mitigate the impact of seasonal effects. For each firm-year, we keep the maximum V m as an annual measure. Then we rank this annual measure within the sample. The volatility indicator (SVOL) is equal to one if an observation is in the top one-third of the sample, and zero otherwise.
The outcomes of cautious behavior
To test Hypotheses 1 to 3, we first compare the performance, probability of business failure, and the level of accounting conservatism between cautious and non-cautious firms. As described previously, we make comparison in the three aspects during the five-year period following event A t (three-index setting) and A' t (fourcrual management with real activities manipulations after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Zang (2012) also finds a substitution effect between real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management. Specifically, she uses an empirical model considering the trade-offs between the two earnings management methods, and she finds that managers do make choices on these two methods based on the relative costs, and managers adjust the level of accrual-based management based on the level of real activities manipulation realized.
index setting). We also make comparisons using all available data, assuming cautious activities reveal the firm's type. That is, we make comparison in the above three aspects based on the indicators TYPE (threeindex setting) and TYPE' (four-index setting). We describe our measures as follows.
Performance. For performance, we consider accounting profitability, i.e., return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). ROA is measured as earnings (Compustat Annual Data Item 18) divided by total assets (Compustat Annual Data Item 6) at the beginning of the fiscal year. ROE is measured as earnings (Compustat Annual Data Item 18) divided by total equity (Compustat Annual Data Item 60) at the beginning of the fiscal year. We compute mean and median profitability for the cautious group and non-cautious group during the five-year period following cautious activities A t and A' t , as well as the profitability throughout company history. As stated above, we expect that cautious firms will exhibit higher profitability.
Probability of business failure. We Z-Score (Altman 1968 ) to proxy for a company's probability of business failure. Z-score is a linear model in which five measures are objectively weighted and summed up to arrive at an overall score. It is widely used to infer the probability of business failure. According to the Altman's (1968) model, the formulation of Z-Score is: Z = 1.2(working capital/total assets) + 1.4(retained earnings/total assets) + 3.3(earnings before interest and taxes/total assets) + 0.6(market value of equity/book value of total liabilities) + (sales/total assets).
Conservatism.
We use Basu's (1997) measure of conditional conservatism to execute our main tests.
Specifically, Basu estimates the following pooled cross-sectional model, predicting and finding a significant and positive β 3 :
where i indexes the firm, t indexes time, NI is net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations of firm i in year t, deflated by market value of equity at the beginning of year t, RET is the CRSP twelve month buy-and-hold return of firm i ending in the month of fiscal year-end t, and NEG is a dummy variable coded as one if RET is negative, and zero otherwise.
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Following Basu (1997) and LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008), we estimate the following specification of the model:
A positive and significant coefficient β 3 means that bad news (NEG) is more quickly reflected in financial reporting (NI) than good news, consistent with managers imposing stricter verification requirements for gains than for losses when reporting earnings. where TYPE is coded as one if a firm contemporaneously cuts capital investment and discretionary spending and reduces employee hiring and zero otherwise. As stated above, we also consider TYPE', which is coded one if a firm contemporarily cuts capital investment and discretionary spending and reduces employee hiring provided its stock volatility is high, and zero otherwise.
We include control variables known to be related to conservatism. MB is the market-to-book ratio, reflecting asset conservatism and growth options. SIZE is measured as the market value of equity. LEV is the leverage ratio and reflects lenders' demand for conservatism. LIT controls for litigation risk, which is measured as an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is in a litigious industry (SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370-7374) in year t and zero otherwise. Based on hypothesis 3, we expect that coefficient on RET * TYPE to be positive and that on RET* NEG * TYPE to be negative. Based on the literature, we would expect a positive coefficient on RET * NEG, indicating that managers incorporate bad news into earnings on a more timely basis than good news.
For robustness checks we also use C-Score (Khan and Watts 2009) We then combine the estimated coefficients and the values for firm-specific size, market-to-book, and leverage to calculate C-Score in the following model:
t Size i,t + λ 3,t M/B i,t + λ 4,t Lev i,t
High C-scores indicate a high degree of conditional conservatism. We therefore expect that cautious firms have lower C-Scores than non-cautious firms.
IV. RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
We obtain firm financial data from COMPUSTAT and return data from CRSP. Our sample, which covers years 1970-2009, consists of 152,293 firm-years that have sufficient data to be included in our crosssectional conservatism tests. Table 3 show the p-values for tests of differences in the means and medians, respectively. The differences in means and medians all have expected signs and are all statistically significant. Consistent with Table2, we find the following differences. First, cautious firms have higher growth opportunities. The means and medians of market-to-book values are greater for cautious firms than for non-cautious ones; these differences are statistically significant at the 0.001 level. Second, the means and medians of leverage are smaller for cautious firms than for non-cautious ones, indicating that cautious firms use less debt. Third, cautious firms are more likely to operate in a more litigious environment. These differences are statistically significant at the 0.001 level.
Firm performance
We compare the performances of cautious and non-cautious firms in Table 4 . Panel A to D show the ROA and ROE by using A t , A' t , TYPE, and TYPE' as partition variables, respectively. As shown in Panel A and B, the means and medians of both ROA and ROE are much higher in the cautious group, implying that cautious firms perform better on average during the five-year period following precautionary actions. We find consistent results if we define caution as a persistent firm characteristic. As shown in Panel C and D, the ROA and ROE are significantly higher for the firms of cautious type throughout the company history. The differences between the two groups are statistically significant (p values <0.001).
The results in Table 4 are consistent with Hypothesis 1, which predicts that companies that exhibit managerial caution are characterized by higher long-term profitability. Since the real options theory predicts that caution increases the value of the firm (e.g., Bernanke 1983 ) and the prior literature that explains the presence of both high-and low-sensitivity corporations in the cross-section (e.g., Wolf et al. 2008) , Table 4 provides general evidence that caution is valuable because it improves operational performance of the firm, as measured by accounting profitability. Note that this result is inconsistent with the results reported in the literature on excessive managerial risk-avoidance (e.g., John et al. 2008 ) that is shown to have in general negative effect on future performance. Table 5 reports the univariate tests on the long-term solvency of different firm types. Similar to Table 5 , Panel A to D show the Z-scores by using A t , A' t , TYPE, and TYPE' as partition variables, respectively. As shown in the table, Z-scores are all above 3 for means and medians for the cautious group, regardless of whether caution is defined based on three or four indexes and whether the scores are calculated for a subsequent fiveyear period or throughout the company history. According to Altman (1968) , all firms having a Z-score of greater than 2.99 clearly fall into the "non-bankrupt" category, while the interval between 1.81 and 2.99 is defined as the "zone of ignorance" or "gray area" with the possibility of misclassification. On the other hand, the Z-scores for the non-cautious type are in general smaller, although they are above 2 and do not indicate financial distress. The differences between the two groups are statistically significant (p values < 0.001).
Long-term solvency
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, our results show that cautious firms face lower financial distress. Indeed, as shown in Table 2 , the variable TYPE is significantly and negatively correlated with leverage (LEV). In addition, Table 3 also shows that the leverage of the cautious type is significantly lower than the non-cautious type at less than 1% level. Both results are consistent with our findings in Table 5 . Fama-Macbeth(1973) t-statistics corrected for autocorrelation using the Newey-West procedure. Our variable of interest is the interaction between RET * NEG and TYPE. The first column shows the results based on the partitioning variable A t . We find that the coefficient on RET * TYPE is significantly positive (Coeff. = 0.021; t = 3.02), while the coefficient on RET * NEG * TYPE is significantly negative (Coeff. = -0.126; t = -8.53). This suggests that for cautious firms, earnings are less timely in recognizing good news and more timely in recognizing bad news. Similarly, we document significantly negative coefficients for columns 2-4, which use A' t , TYPE, and TYPE' for measuring caution. The coefficients are -0.078 (t = -3.63), -0.079 (t = -6.23), and -0.099 (t = -5.18), respectively. The asymmetric timeliness indicates that these firms are less likely to be conservative. This result is consistent with our prediction that managerial caution and accounting conservatism are substitutes: when the former is present, the latter is redundant.
Conservatism
Turning to control variables, conditional conservatism predicts a positive coefficient on RET * NEG, indicating that companies incorporate bad news into earnings on a more timely basis than good news. The coefficient on RET * NEG is 0.720 and significant (t = 13.68), confirming this relation. The coefficient on RET * NEG * MB is -0.063, which is consistent with the negative relation between asymmetric timeliness and MB documented in prior studies such as LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) . We also report a significant coefficient on RET * NEG * LEV of 0.029, indicating that firms with greater leverage (LEV) are more asymmetrically timely in recognizing bad news, consistent with the asymmetric nature of debtholders' payoffs.
The coefficient on RET * NEG * SIZE is -0.022 (t = -4.13), consistent with past studies such as LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) . Finally, consistent with existing literature, we fail to find evidence that firms in highlitigation-risk industries exhibit greater conservatism. Table 7 provides the mean and median values of C-Scores for both cautious and non-cautious groups.
Panels A to D show the C-scores by using A t , A' t , TYPE, and TYPE' as partition variables, respectively.
Higher C-scores indicate a high degree of conditional conservatism (Khan and Watts 2009 ). The results indicate that, compared with the cautious group, the mean and median values of C-Scores in the non-cautious group are much larger, confirming our main findings that greater managerial caution is associated with less conservative accounting. The mean and median differences in C-Scores between the two groups are statistically significant (p values <0.001). Thus, our evidence supports Hypothesis 3. Table 8 reports correlations between cautious types and risk proxies. We use two measures to proxy for risk:
Caution and risk aversion
firm-specific standard deviation of earnings and standard deviation of cash flows. If our measures for caution capture risk, we expect to see high correlations between caution and risk measures. As shown in the table, both TYPE and TYPE' are significantly correlated with the two risk measures, yet the correlations are small, indicating that they probably capture different aspects of firm characteristics. Note that three out of four correlations have a positive sign; if our measure of caution was capturing risk aversion, the correlations would have been positive. One possible explanation of the positive correlation is that firms operating in risky environments have to be cautious. Another explanation is that caution and risk aversion are distinct constructs that capture different characteristics of decision makers. In fact, given that both prudence (i.e., caution) and fortitude (which can be thought of as boldness) are considered among the four traditional cardinal virtues, we conjecture that these two properties are complementary. In other words, a person who is both attentive to the environment and bold in her decisions should be more successful in an uncertain world.
V. DISCUSSION
Our main empirical result confirms the intuition that managerial caution and accounting conservatism are substitutes in the sense that the presence of the former obviates the need for the latter. The result is consistent with the contracting explanation of accounting conservatism: various stakeholders (including creditors, suppliers, and employees, among others) stand to gain more from conservative bias in financial statements when the company is not run in a cautions manner, whatever the reason for the lack of caution might be. At the same time, the stakeholders of companies run by cautious management teams have less to gain from conservative reporting. Our argument, which is ultimately based on the well-known fact that managerial and accounting decisions are usually made by distinct groups of people, sheds new light on the effect of the style of corporate decision making on the properties of financial reporting and thus complements the literature that studies the mechanisms where causality goes in the opposite direction (e.g., Biddle et al. 2011a, b) .
Turning now to our main construct of managerial caution, we would like to outline the questions that it raises and the avenues for future research. First, our empirical evidence suggests that caution is distinct from the attitudes toward risk, including risk (and ambiguity) aversion, over-optimism, and overconfidence. We believe that the empirically observable cross-sectional differences in caution are most convincingly explained by combining the theory of real options (Bernanke 1983) , the theory of decision making with unawareness (Li 2009; Grant and Quiggin 2011; Heifetz et al. 2011) , and the differential sensitivity framework developed in theoretical biology (Wolf et al. 2008 ) -although other explanations are certainly possible.
Risk aversion has been extensively used to explain corporate investment decisions since the publication of Jensen and Meckling (1976) , the agency argument hinges on the assumption that the decisions are made by individual managers -even though it is well known that important corporate decisions are made by groups of individuals (see, e.g., Fama and Jensen 1980) . In addition, risk aversion as a quantifiable property is rather difficult to pin down because empirical estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion across various studies differ by more than three orders of magnitude (see, e.g., Levine 2009 ). Managerial caution viewed as a superior ability to discern emergent opportunities and threats is a real property that has been described in the large literature in psychology (Ellis et al. 2011 ). As we argue in Section II, its existence as a characteristic of corporate decision making is consistent with the results in theoretical biology (Wolf et al. 2008 ) and the literature on unawareness (Li 2009, Grant and Quiggin 2011) and merits further investigation.
Cross-sectional differences in managerial caution in the above sense can also be viewed as a natural source of disagreement, which is the focus of a large and growing literature in economics (e.g., Kandel and Pearson 1995) , finance (e.g., Thakor and Whited 2011), and accounting (e.g., Atiase et al. 2011) . Although the modeling approach that allows decision makers to hold different priors has gained acceptance over recent years, the origin of the difference still awaits a compelling explanation. Our argument and empirical results suggest an avenue for future research that may provide it.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this study we reexamine the value of caution, a quality that has been viewed as a virtue throughout the recorded human history. Our main insight is that the combination of the real options mechanism from economics (Bernanke 1983) with the differential sensitivity framework from theoretical biology (Wolf et al. 2008 ) provides a compelling explanation of the cross-sectional variation in caution and shows that it is best understood as a combination of vigilance and reflection -rather than an attitude toward risk. In fact, the two characteristics appear to be distinct. We propose an empirical measure of caution as perceived by managers, which is based on their revealed preferences. We validate our measure by showing that, as predicted by economic theory, caution increases the profitability of the firm, decreases the probability of business failure, and is negatively related with the received measures of conditional accounting conservatism. The latter result is consistent with the prediction that managerial caution and accounting conservatism are substitutes and helps explain the consistent opposition of accounting standard setters to the idea of enshrining accounting conservatism in financial reporting standards. a NI is net income before extraordinary items divided by beginning of fiscal year market value of equity. RET is the buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year. NEG is a dichotomous variable that equal to one if RET is negative, and zero otherwise. MB is the market-to-book ratio (Compustat #199*Compustat #25/Compustat #60) at the beginning of the fiscal year. LEV is total debt (Compustat #9 + Compustat #34) divided by total assets (Compustat #6) at the beginning of the fiscal year. SIZE is the market value of equity (in millions of dollars) at the beginning of the fiscal year (Compustat #199*Compustat #25). LIT is coded one if a firm is in a litigious industry-SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370-7374 , and zero otherwise.
b TYPE is coded as one if a firm once contemporarily cut capital investment and discretionary spending and reduced employee hiring during the past five years, and zero otherwise.
TYPE' is coded as one if a firm once contemporarily cut capital investment and discretionary spending and reduced employee hiring and it stock volatility is high during the past five years, and zero otherwise. TYPE is coded as one if a firm once contemporarily cut capital investment and discretionary spending and reduced employee hiring during the past five years, and zero otherwise.
TYPE' is coded as one if a firm once contemporarily cut capital investment and discretionary spending and reduced employee hiring and it stock volatility is high during the past five years, and zero otherwise.
For Panel C and D:
TYPE is coded as one if a firm once contemporarily cut capital investment and discretionary spending and reduced employee hiring in the whole period, and zero otherwise. TYPE' is coded as one if a firm once contemporarily cut capital investment and discretionary spending and reduced employee hiring and it stock volatility is high in the whole period and zero otherwise. Altman's (1968) model is: Z =1.2(working capital/total assets) +1.4(retained earnings/total assets)+3.3(earnings before interest and taxes/total assets)+ 0.6(market value of equity/book value of total liabilities)+(sales/total assets).
b For Panel A and B:
TYPE is coded as one if a firm once contemporarily cut capital investment and discretionary spending and reduced employee hiring during the past five years, and zero otherwise.
TYPE is coded as one if a firm once contemporarily cut capital investment and discretionary spending and reduced employee hiring in the whole period, and zero otherwise.
TYPE' is coded as one if a firm once contemporarily cut capital investment and discretionary spending and reduced employee hiring and it stock volatility is high in the whole period and zero otherwise. (-11.62) a NI is equal to net income before extraordinary items divided by beginning of fiscal year market value of equity. RET is equal to the buy-and-hold return over the fiscal year. NEG is equal to one if RET is negative, zero otherwise. MB is equal to the scaled decile rank of the market-to-book ratio (Compustat #199 * Compustat #25/Compustat #60) at the beginning of the fiscal year. LEV is equal to the scaled decile rank of total debt (Compustat #9 + Compustat #34) divided by total assets (Compustat #6) at the beginning of the fiscal year. SIZE is equal to the scaled decile rank of market value of equity (in millions of dollars) at the beginning of the fiscal year (Compustat #199 * Compustat #25). LIT is coded one if a firm is in a litigious industry-SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 7370-7374and zero otherwise.
b For Column 1 and 2:
For Column 3 and 4:
TYPE' is coded as one if a firm once contemporarily cut capital investment and discretionary spending and reduced employee hiring and it stock volatility is high in the whole period and zero otherwise.
c t-values in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level or better, respectively. p-values are one-tailed when the sign of the coefficient is predicted, two-tailed otherwise. TYPE is coded as one if a firm once contemporarily cut capital investment and discretionary spending and reduced employee hiring during the past five years, and zero otherwise.
TYPE' is coded as one if a firm once contemporarily cut capital investment and discretionary spending and reduced employee hiring and it stock volatility is high in the whole period and zero otherwise. a TYPE is coded as one if a firm once contemporarily cut capital investment and discretionary spending and reduced employee hiring in the whole period, and zero otherwise.
